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On the existence and uniqueness of nonoptimal equilibria in dynamic stochastic economies
The question of the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium for distorted versions of the standard neoclassical growth model is addressed in this paper. The conditions presented guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of nontrivial equilibrium for the class of economies under study are simple and intuitively appealing, while the existence and uniqueness proof developed is elementary. Examples are presented illustrating that economies with distortional taxation, endogenous growth with externalities, and monopolistic competition can all fit into the framework developed.
Working Paper
The dynamics of immigration policy with wealth-heterogeneous immigrants
In this paper we consider a simple intertemporal economy in which immigrants, if admitted, bring heterogeneous amounts of capital. We show that under certain conditions there is a level of immigration which maximizes the economy's capital-labor ratio, and that this level of immigration is the preferred choice of a majority of the economy's citizens. We then characterize, in an overlapping generations setting, the dynamics of capital accumulation and immigration policy, which can include multiple steady state equilibria and a sensitivity of immigration levels to changes in the economy's ...
Working Paper
On the existence of nonoptimal equilibria in dynamic stochastic economies
The question of the existence of the stationary equilibrium for distorted versions of the standard neo-classical growth model is addressed in this paper. The conditions presented guaranteeing the existence of nontrivial equilibrium for the class of economies under study are simple and intuitively appealing, while the existence proof developed is elementary. Examples are given illustrating that economies with distortional taxation, endogenous growth with externalities, and monopolistic competition can all fit into the framework provided.
Working Paper
The political economy of endogenous taxation and redistribution
This paper examines a simple dynamic model in which agents vote over capital income taxation and redistributive transfers. We show that in equilibrium the typical agent's preferences over the tax rate are single-peaked and derive a closed-form solution for the majority-rule tax rate. We also show that high levels of initial wealth inequality can place the economy on the 'wrong side of the Laffer curve'.