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Working Paper
Competition, syndication, and entry in the venture capital market
There are two ways for a venture capital (VC) firm to enter a new market: initiate a new deal or form a syndicate with an incumbent. Both types of entry are extensively observed in the data. In this paper, I examine (i) the causes of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms, (ii) the impact of entry on VC contract terms and survival rates of VC-backed start-up companies, and (iii) the effect of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms on the competition in the VC market and the outcomes of incumbent-backed ventures. By developing a theoretical model featuring endogenous ...
Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection.In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex ante ...
Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection. In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex-ante ...