Search Results
Report
A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
There is now an extensive literature regarding the efficient design of incentive mechanisms in dynamic environments. In this literature, there are no exogenous links across time periods because either privately observed shocks are assumed time independent or past private actions have no influence on the realizations of current variables. The absence of exogenous links across time periods ensures that preferences over continuation contracts are common knowledge, making the definition of incentive compatible contracts at a point in time a simple matter. In this paper, we present general ...
Working Paper
Learning to export from neighbors
This paper studies how learning from neighboring firms affects new exporters? performance. We develop a statistical decision model in which a firm updates its prior belief about demand in a foreign market based on several factors, including the number of neighbors currently selling there, the level and heterogeneity of their export sales, and the firm?s own prior knowledge about the market. A positive signal about demand inferred from neighbors? export performance raises the firm?s probability of entry and initial sales in the market but, conditional on survival, lowers its post-entry growth. ...