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Working Paper
Financial intermediaries, markets, and growth.
We build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. Our model predicts that bank-oriented economies should grow slower than more market-oriented economies, which is consistent with some recent empirical evidence. We show that the mix of ...
Working Paper
The Role of Interbank Relationships and Liquidity Needs
In this paper, we focus on the interconnectedness of banks and the price they pay for liquidity. We assess how the concentration of credit relationships and the position of a bank in the network topology of the system influence the bank?s ability to meet its liquidity demand. We use quarterly data of bilateral interbank credit exposures between all German banks from 2000 to 2008 to measure interbank relationships and the network characteristics. We match these data with the bids placed by the individual banks in the European Central Bank?s (ECB) weekly repo auctions. The bids measure each ...
Working Paper
Financial intermediaries, markets, and growth
In many models of financial intermediation, markets reduce welfare because they limit the amount of risk-sharing intermediaries can offer. In this paper we study a model in which markets also promote investment in a productive technology. A trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises endogenously. In the model, financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be beneficial ...
Working Paper
The Eurosystem money market auctions: a banking perspective
This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of the third quarter of 2000 to the end of the first quarter of 2001. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account. In particular, we consider variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in the banks? respective bidding behavior to a large extent. Thus our study contributes to a ...
Working Paper
Relationship lending in the interbank market and the price of liquidity
We empirically investigate the effect that relationship lending has on the availability and pricing of interbank liquidity. Our analysis is based on a daily panel of unsecured overnight loans between 1,079 distinct German bank pairs from March 2006 to November 2007, a period that includes the 2007 liquidity crisis that marked the beginning of the 2007/08 global financial crisis. We find that (i) relationship lenders are more likely to provide liquidity to their closest borrowers, (ii) particularly opaque borrowers obtain liquidity at lower rates when borrowing from their relationship lenders, ...
Working Paper
International financial integration, crises, and monetary policy: evidence from the euro area interbank crises
We analyze how financial crises affect international financial integration, exploiting euro area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary policy shocks, and variation in loan terms to the same borrower on the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of crossborder liquidity, with stronger volume effects than pricing effects, thereby impairing international financial integration. On the extensive margin, there is flight to home ? but this is independent of quality. On the intensive margin, however, GIPS-headquartered debtor banks suffer in the Lehman ...
Working Paper
Substitution between net and gross settlement systems: A concern for financial stability?
While net settlement systems make more efficient use of liquidity than gross settlement systems, they are known to generate systemic risk. What does that tendency imply for the stability of the payments (or financial) system when the two settlement systems coexist? Do liquidity shortages induce banks to settle more transactions in the net settlement system, thereby increasing systemic risk? Or do banks require their counterparties to send payments through the gross settlement system when default risks are high, increasing the need for liquidity and the money market rate but reducing overall ...
Report
Banks, markets, and efficiency
In this paper, we address the question whether increasing households' financial market access improves welfare in a financial system in which there is intense competition among banks for private households' funds. Following earlier work by Diamond and by Fecht, we use a model in which the degree of liquidity insurance offered to households through banks' deposit contracts is restrained by households' financial market access. However, we also assume spatial monopolistic competition among banks. Because monopoly rents are assumed to bring about inefficiencies, improved financial market access ...