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Working Paper
Do creditor rights increase employment risk? evidence from debt covenants
This paper studies whether financial contracts exacerbate or mitigate agency conflicts among stakeholders. We consider a specific contractual provision, debt covenants, and examine how, by allocating control rights between shareholders and debtholders, debt covenants affect the employment relationship. We analyze the role of covenants in both public (bonds) and private (loans) debt contracts. For public debt covenants, we estimate dynamic employment equations and find a significant negative effect of leverage on employment only for firms with relatively high covenant protection. For private ...
Working Paper
Happiness maintenance and asset prices
This paper constructs a simple dynamic asset pricing model which incorporates recent evidence on the influence of immediate emotions on risk preferences. Investors derive direct utility from both consumption and financial wealth and, consistent with the happiness maintenance feature documented by Isen (1999) and others, become more cautious toward their wealth in good times. Mild pro-cyclical changes in risk aversion over wealth cause large pro-cyclical fluctuations in the current price-dividend ratio which, due to general equilibrium restrictions, translate into counter-cyclical variation in ...
Working Paper
CEO pay and the market for CEOs
Competitive sorting models of the CEO labor market (e.g., Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009)) predict that differences in CEO productive abilities, or "talent", should be an important determinant of CEO pay. However, measuring CEO talent empirically represents a major challenge. In this paper, we document reliable evidence of pay for CEO credentials and argue that the evidence is consistent with models of the CEO labor market. Our main finding is that boards' compensation decisions reward several reputational, career, and educational credentials of CEOs, with newly-appointed CEOs earning a 5 ...
Working Paper
Optimal CEO incentives and industry dynamics
This paper develops a competitive equilibrium model of CEO compensation and industry dynamics. CEOs make product pricing and product improvement decisions subject to shareholders' compensation choices and idiosyncratic shocks to product quality. The choice of high-powered incentives optimally trades off the benefits from expected product improvements and the associated agency costs. In market equilibrium, the interaction between CEO pay and product market decisions affects the stationary distribution of firms. We characterize a dynamic feedback effect of industry structure on CEO incentives. ...
Working Paper
Banks as Regulated Traders
This paper uses detailed high-frequency regulatory data to evaluate whether trading increases or decreases systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector. We estimate the sensitivity of weekly bank trading net profits to a variety of aggregate risk factors, which include equities, fixed-income, derivatives, foreign exchange, and commodities. We find that U.S. banks had large trading exposures to equity market risk before the introduction of the Volcker Rule in 2014 and that they curtailed these exposures afterwards. Pre-rule equity risk exposures were large across the board of the main asset ...
Working Paper
Do Creditor Rights Increase Employment Risk? Evidence from Loan Covenants
Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on employees. There are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors exercise their ex post control rights. The negative impact of violations on employment is stronger for firms that face more severe agency and financing frictions and those whose employees have weaker bargaining power. Employment cuts following violations are much larger during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer ...
Working Paper
Rising intangible capital, shrinking debt capacity, and the US corporate savings glut
This paper explores the hypothesis that the rise in intangible capital is a fundamental driver of the secular trend in US corporate cash holdings over the last decades. Using a new measure,we show that intangible capital is the most important firm-level determinant of corporate cash holdings. Our measure accounts for almost as much of the secular increase in cash since the 1980s as all other determinants together. We then develop a new dynamic model of corporate cash holdings with two types of productive assets, tangible and intangible capital. Since only tangible capital can be pledged as ...
Working Paper
Banks as Regulated Traders
Banks use trading as a vehicle to take risk. Using unique high-frequency regulatory data, we estimate the sensitivity of weekly bank trading profits to aggregate equity, fixed-income, credit, currency and commodity risk factors. Our estimates imply that U.S. banks had large trading exposures to equity market risk before the Volcker Rule, which they curtailed afterwards. They also have exposures to credit and currency risk. The results hold up in a quasi-natural experimental design that exploits the phased-in introduction of reporting requirements to address identification. Heterogeneity and ...
Working Paper
CEO successions and firm performance in the US financial industry
This paper examines the labor market for CEOs in the financial sector from 1988 to 2007, using a new hand-collected sample of 1,655 CEO successions. We document that there is a significant role of outside successions, as about one out of two successions involves an outside hire. In addition, using difference-in-differences estimates, we study the link between the labor market for finance CEOs and firm performance. We document that (1) there is a large performance gap between inside and outside successions, as outside successions are followed by significantly larger improvements in firm ...
Working Paper
Why Do Innovative Firms Hold So Much Cash? Evidence from Changes in State R&D Tax Credits
This paper uses the staggered changes of R&D tax credits across U.S. states and over time as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of innovation on corporate liquidity. By generating plausibly independent variation in firms' incentive to invest in R&D, we are able to assess the empirical importance of specific theories of the link between innovation and corporate liquidity. Firms increase (decrease) their cash to asset ratios by about one and a half percentage point when their home state increases (cuts) R&D tax credits. These baseline difference-in-differences estimates hold up to ...