Search Results
Working Paper
The Fed's Discount Window in "Normal" Times
We study transaction-level data of bank borrowings at the Federal Reserve’s discount window from 2010 to 2019. We merge these data with quarterly information on bank balance sheets and income statements. To aid in the interpretation of our empirical analysis, we also develop a detailed model of the decision of banks to borrow from various sources, including the discount window. The objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the reasons why banks use the discount window during “normal” times—periods of relative calm in financial markets. Consistent with our model, we find ...
Working Paper
The Fed's Discount Window in "Normal" Times
We study new transaction-level data of discount window borrowing in the U.S. between 2010 and 2017, merged with quarterly data on bank financial con- ditions (balance sheet and revenue). The objective is to improve our under- standing of the reasons for why banks use the discount window during periods outside financial crises. We also provide a model of the decision of banks to borrow at the window, which is helpful for interpreting the data. We find that decisions to gain access and to borrow at the discount window are meaning- fully correlated with some relevant banks' characteristics and ...
Discussion Paper
Search, money, and inflation under private information
I study a version of the Lagos-Wright (2003) model of monetary exchange in which buyers have private information about their tastes and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it-offers (i.e., have the power to set prices and quantities). The introduction of imperfect information makes the existence of monetary equilibrium a more robust feature of the environment. In general, the model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous ...
Report
Run equilibria in a model of financial intermediation
We study the Green and Lin (2003) model of financial intermediation with two new features: traders may face a cost of contacting the intermediary, and consumption needs may be correlated across traders. We show that each feature is capable of generating an equilibrium in which some (but not all) traders ?run? on the intermediary by withdrawing their funds at the first opportunity regardless of their true consumption needs. Our results also provide some insight into elements of the economic environment that are necessary for a run equilibrium to exist in general models of financial ...
Report
Commitment and equilibrium bank runs
We study the role of commitment in a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with no aggregate uncertainty. As is well known, the banking authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start. We show, however, that in an environment without commitment, the banking authority will choose to only partially suspend payments during a run. In some cases, the reduction in early payouts under this partial suspension is insufficient to dissuade depositors from participating in the run. Bank runs can then occur with positive ...
Briefing
How Bank Lending Standards Shape the U.S. Macroeconomy
Changes in lending standards affect GDP performance, with changes to business lending standards having a greater impact on overall U.S. economic growth than changes to household lending standards.The tightening of business lending standards is associated with a significant and persistent drop in real GDP growth. The magnitude of the effect depends on economic conditions, as it is significantly stronger when GDP is below its long-run trend, interest rates are away from their effective lower bound or economic uncertainty is elevated.A tightening of bank lending standards has a larger, more ...
Briefing
Discount Window Lending: Policy Trade-offs and the 1985 BoNY Computer Failure
On November 21, 1985, the Bank of New York (BoNY) suffered a software failure that left it unable to redeliver securities it had received from other institutions as an intermediary. The result of the failure was that the bank sought and received $22.6 billion in discount window lending from the New York Fed, a record-setting amount. The episode presents a case study for considering when discount window lending and similar interventions are justified as a matter of efficiency, as well as the need for policymakers to take account of possible moral hazard that may lead to inadequate safeguards ...
Briefing
Basel III and the continuing evolution of bank capital regulation
Adopted in part as a response to the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Basel III accord is the most recent revision to international capital standards for banks. Basel III primarily relies on methods similar to those of Basel II for assessing the relative risks of different types of assets. The main focus of the changes in Basel III, rather, is to increase banks' equity capital requirements. This emphasis is a reflection of the conclusions drawn from the crisis: that bank fragility is more prevalent than previously thought and that the motivation for governments to assist banks in poor financial ...
Briefing
Large Excess Reserves and the Relationship between Money and Prices
As a consequence of the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis of 2007?08 and the Great Recession, the supply of reserves in the U.S. banking system increased dramatically. Historically, over long horizons, money and prices have been closely tied together, but over the past decade, prices have risen only modestly while base money (reserves plus currency) has grown substantially. A macroeconomic model helps explain this behavior and suggests some potential limits to the Fed's ability to increase the size of its balance sheet indefinitely while remaining consistent with its ...
Briefing
Excess reserves and the new challenges for monetary policy
Interest on reserves allows the Federal Reserve to pursue an appropriate monetary policy even with a high level of excess reserves. However, a banking system flush with excess reserves can raise the risk of monetary policy getting behind the curve.