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Author:Diba, Behzad T. 

Working Paper
Money, inflation and the expected real interest rate

Working Papers , Paper 89-8

Conference Paper
Price- and wage- inflation targeting: variations on a theme by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin

Proceedings

Working Paper
Have money-stock fluctuations had a liquidity effect on expected real interest rates?

Working Papers , Paper 88-19

Journal Article
Private-sector decisions and the U.S. trade deficit

Business Review , Issue Sep , Pages 15-24

Conference Paper
Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?

Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole

Working Paper
Rational bubbles in stock prices?

Working Papers , Paper 87-20

Working Paper
Bubbles and stock price volatility

Working Papers , Paper 89-19

Conference Paper
Bubbles and stock-price volatility

Proceedings

Working Paper
Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements and Implementable Capital Buffer Rules

We build a quantitatively relevant macroeconomic model with endogenous risk-taking. In our model, deposit insurance and limited liability can lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. This excessive risk-taking can be triggered by aggregate or sectoral shocks that reduce the return on safer loans. Excessive risk-taking can be avoided by raising bank capital requirements, but unnecessarily tight requirements lower welfare by limiting liquidity producing bank deposits. Consequently, optimal capital requirements are dynamic (or state contingent). We provide examples in which ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-056

Working Paper
A Static Capital Buffer is Hard To Beat

In a model with endogenous risk-taking, deposit insurance and limited liability may lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. Capital requirements can prevent excessive risk-taking at the cost of reducing liquidity-producing bank deposits. A policy that sets capital requirements just high enough to prevent excessive risktaking will move capital requirements pro-, counter-, or a-cyclically depending on the shock source. However, such a policy requires full knowledge of all the shocks hitting the economy and is not implementable. Simple rules that respond to cyclical ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-042

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