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Journal Article
Fiscal and monetary policy: conference summary
This Economic Letter summarizes the papers presented at a conference on "Fiscal and Monetary Policy" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 4 and 5, 2005.
Working Paper
Monetary policy in a small open economy with a preference for robustness
We use robust control techniques to study the effects of model uncertainty on monetary policy in an estimated, semi-structural, small-open-economy model of the U.K. Compared to the closed economy, the presence of an exchange rate channel for monetary policy not only produces new trade-offs for monetary policy, but it also introduces an additional source of specification errors. We find that exchange rate shocks are an important contributor to volatility in the model, and that the exchange rate equation is particularly vulnerable to model misspecification, along with the equation for domestic ...
Journal Article
Time-inconsistent monetary policies: recent research
This Economic Letter looks at time-inconsistency, describing why the same mechanisms that can lead to higher average inflation also can hamper policymakers' efforts to keep inflation stable.
Working Paper
Expectations traps and coordination failures: selecting among multiple discretionary equilibria
Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot co- ordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper, we employ notions of robustness, learnability, and the potential for coalitions to motivate and develop a suite of equilibrium selection criteria. Central among these criteria are whether the ...
Journal Article
Finance and macroeconomics
This Economic Letter summarizes papers presented at the conference "Finance and Macroeconomics" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on February 28 and March 1, 2003, under the joint sponsorship of the Bank and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. The papers are listed at the end and are available at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0303/index.html.
Working Paper
Steps toward identifying central bank policy preferences
This paper takes the parameters in central bank loss functions as fundamental preferences to be estimated from the data. It is these preferences (along with target values) that define the policy regime in operation and that potentially change with senior central bank appointments. Optimizing central banks apply policy rules whose feedback coefficients are functions of its preferences. Consequently, under some conditions, it is possible to back out estimates of the preference parameters from estimated policy reaction functions. This paper establishes conditions under which a policy regime can ...
Working Paper
Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent
This paper studies robust control problems when policy is set with commitment. One contribution of the paper is to articulate an approximating equilibrium that differs importantly from that developed in Hansen and Sargent (2003). The paper illustrates how the proposed approximating equilibrium differs from Hansen-Sargent in the context of two New Keynesian business cycle models. A further contribution of the paper is to show that once misspecification is acknowledged commitment is no longer necessarily superior to discretion.
Journal Article
Monetary policy and exchange rates in small open economies
Journal Article
Interest rates and monetary policy: conference summary
This Economic Letter summarizes the papers presented at a conference on "Interest Rates and Monetary Policy" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 19 and 20, 2004, under the joint sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. The papers are listed at the end and are available at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0403/index.html
Working Paper
Pre-commitment, the timeless perspective, and policymaking from behind a veil of uncertainty
Woodford (1999) develops the notion of a "timelessly optimal" pre-commitment policy. This paper uses a simple business cycle model to illustrate this notion. We show that timelessly optimal policies are not unique and that they are not necessarily better than the time-consistent solution. Further, we describe a method for constructing optimal pre-commitment rules in an environment where the policymaker does not know the initial state of the economy. This latter solution is useful for characterizing the benefits policymakers extract through exploiting initial conditions.