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Author:Covitz, Daniel M. 

Working Paper
Securitization markets and central banking: an evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan facility

In response to the near collapse of US securitization markets in 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which offered non-recourse loans to finance investors' purchases of certain highly rated asset-backed securities. We study the effects of this program and find that it lowered interest rate spreads for some categories of asset-backed securities but had little impact on the pricing of individual securities. These findings suggest that the program improved conditions in securitization markets but did not subsidize individual securities. We also find ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-16

Conference Paper
Are some bank managers issuing bonds to call attention to their banks, while other managers are hiding by not issuing?

Proceedings , Paper 814

Working Paper
The evolution of a financial crisis: panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market

The $350 billion contraction in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last five months of 2007 played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis. This paper attempts to better understand why the substantial contraction in ABCP occurred by measuring and analyzing runs on ABCP programs over the period from August 2007 through December 2007. While it has been suggested that commercial paper programs, like commercial banks, may be prone to runs, we are the first to conduct a comprehensive empirical ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2009-36

Conference Paper
The anatomy of a financial crisis: the evolution of panic-driven runs in the asset-backed commercial paper market

Proceedings , Issue Jan , Pages 1-36

Working Paper
Are longer bankruptcies really more costly?

We test the widely held assumption that longer restructurings are more costly. In contrast to earlier studies, we use instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of restructuring time and creditor return. Instrumenting proves critical to our finding that creditor recovery rates increase with duration for roughly 1 years following default, but decrease thereafter. This, and similar results using the likelihood of reentering bankruptcy, suggest that there may be an optimal time in default. Moreover, the default duration of almost half of our sample is well outside the optimal default ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2006-27

Working Paper
Do banks strategically time public bond issuance because of the accompanying disclosure, due diligence, and investor scrutiny?

This paper tests a new hypothesis that bank managers issue bonds, at least in part, to convey positive, private information and refrain from issuance to hide negative, private information. We find evidence for this hypothesis, using rating migrations, equity returns, bond issuance, and balance sheet data for US bank holding companies. The results add to our understanding of the role of "market discipline" in monitoring bank holding companies and also inform upon how proposed regulatory requirements that banking organizations frequently issue public bonds might augment "market discipline."
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2003-37

Working Paper
Why are bank profits so persistent: the roles of product market competition, informational opacity, and regional/macroeconomic shocks

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistent performance at the high and low ends of the distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of performance; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 1999-28

Working Paper
Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform

We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-53

Working Paper
Do nonfinancial firms use interest rate derivatives to hedge?

We compile and analyze detailed information on the debt structure and interest rate derivative positions of nonfinancial firms in 2000 and 2002. We find that differences in debt structure across firms and time tend to be counterbalanced by difference in derivative positions. In particular, among derivative users, smaller firms tend to have relatively more interest rate exposure from liabilities than larger firms and tend to use derivatives that offset these exposures. Larger firms also tend to limit their interest rate exposures, but they do so through their choice of debt structure rather ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2005-39

Working Paper
Financial stability monitoring

While the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of pre-emptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities arise from ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2013-21

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