Search Results
Working Paper
Do banks strategically time public bond issuance because of the accompanying disclosure, due diligence, and investor scrutiny?
This paper tests a new hypothesis that bank managers issue bonds, at least in part, to convey positive, private information and refrain from issuance to hide negative, private information. We find evidence for this hypothesis, using rating migrations, equity returns, bond issuance, and balance sheet data for US bank holding companies. The results add to our understanding of the role of "market discipline" in monitoring bank holding companies and also inform upon how proposed regulatory requirements that banking organizations frequently issue public bonds might augment "market discipline."
Discussion Paper
Financial Stability Monitoring
In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.
Working Paper
Insolvency or liquidity squeeze? Explaining very short-term corporate yield spreads
In this paper, we first document some stylized facts about very short-term and long-term corporate yield spreads. We find that short-term spreads are sizable, and the correlations between many firms' short-term and long-term yield spreads are at times negative. We then develop a structural model that generates levels and correlations of short-term and long-term spreads that are more consistent with what we observe. The model allows for the possibility of payment delays when a firm's liquid asset position deteriorates. Payment delays generate sizable short-term debt spreads because the ...
Working Paper
Financial stability monitoring
While the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of pre-emptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities arise from ...
Working Paper
The evolution of a financial crisis: panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market
The $350 billion contraction in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last five months of 2007 played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis. This paper attempts to better understand why the substantial contraction in ABCP occurred by measuring and analyzing runs on ABCP programs over the period from August 2007 through December 2007. While it has been suggested that commercial paper programs, like commercial banks, may be prone to runs, we are the first to conduct a comprehensive empirical ...
Working Paper
Monitoring, moral hazard, and market power: a model of bank lending
We model the relationship between market power and both loan interest rates and bank risk without placing strong restrictions on the moral hazard problems between borrowers and banks and between banks and a government guarantor. Our results suggest that these relationships hinge on intuitive parameterizations of the overlapping moral hazard problems. Surprisingly, for lending markets with a high degree of borrower moral hazard but limited bank moral hazard, we find that banks with market power charge lower interest rates than competitive banks. We also find that competition makes banking ...
Working Paper
Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform
We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.
Discussion Paper
Why have far-forward nominal Treasury rates increased so much in the past few years? Old risks reemerge in an era of Fed credibility
Increases in far-forward nominal interest rates in recent years have been remarkable. For example, the increase in the 9- to 10-year forward Treasury rate over the past five years is the largest since its extraordinary ramp-ups in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 1). The increase in far-forward rates is consequential for the economy because higher forward rates mean higher long-term Treasury yields, which boosts the current cost of long-term credit to households and businesses. Indeed, more than 80 percent of the variation in annual changes in the 10-year Treasury yield over the past 50 ...
Working Paper
Testing conflicts of interest at bond rating agencies with market anticipation: evidence that reputation incentives dominate
This paper presents the first comprehensive test of whether well-known conflicts of interest at bond rating agencies importantly influence their actions. This hypothesis is tested against the alternative that rating agency actions are primarily influenced by a countervailing incentive to protect their reputations as delegated monitors. These two hypotheses generate a number of testable predictions regarding the anticipation of credit-rating downgrades by the bond market, which we investigate using a new data set of about 2,000 credit rating migrations from Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and ...