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Working Paper
Are Supply Networks Efficiently Resilient?
We show that supply networks are inefficiently, and insufficiently, resilient. Upstream firms can expand their production capacity to hedge againstsupply and demand shocks. But the social benefits of such investments arenot internalized due to market power and market incompleteness. Upstreamfirms under-invest in capacity and resilience, passing-on the costs to downstreamfirms, and drive trade excessively towards the spot markets. There isa wedge between the market solution and a constrained optimal benchmark,which persists even without rare and large shocks. Policies designed to incentivize ...
Discussion Paper
Can Decentralized Finance Provide More Protection for Crypto Investors?
Several centralized crypto entities failed in 2022, resulting in the cascading failure of other crypto firms and raising questions about the protection of crypto investors. While the total amount invested in the crypto sector remains small in the United States, more than 10 percent of all Americans are invested in cryptocurrencies. In this post, we examine whether migrating crypto activities from centralized platforms to decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols might afford investors better protection, especially in the absence of regulatory changes. We argue that while DeFi provides some ...
Report
Intraday market making with overnight inventory costs
The U.S. Treasury market is highly intermediated by nonbank principal trading firms (PTFs). Limited capital forces PTFs to end the trading day roughly flat. We construct a continuous time market making model to analyze the trade-off faced by a profit-maximizing firm with overnight inventory costs, and develop closed-form representations of the optimal price policy functions. Our model reveals that bid-ask spreads widen as the end of the trading day approaches, and that increases in order arrival rates do not always lead to higher price volatility. Our empirical analysis shows that ...
Working Paper
Managing Counterparty Risk in OTC Markets
We study how banks manage their default risk to optimally negotiate quantities and prices of contracts in over-the-counter markets. We show that costly actions exerted by banks to reduce their default probabilities are inefficient. Negative externalities due to counterparty concentration may lead banks to reduce their default probabilities even below the social optimum. The model provides new implications which are supported by empirical evidence: (i) intermediation is done by low-risk banks with medium initial exposure; (ii) the risk-sharing capacity of the market is impaired, even when the ...