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Author:Canzoneri, Matthew B. 

Working Paper
A Static Capital Buffer is Hard To Beat

In a model with endogenous risk-taking, deposit insurance and limited liability may lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. Capital requirements can prevent excessive risk-taking at the cost of reducing liquidity-producing bank deposits. A policy that sets capital requirements just high enough to prevent excessive risktaking will move capital requirements pro-, counter-, or a-cyclically depending on the shock source. However, such a policy requires full knowledge of all the shocks hitting the economy and is not implementable. Simple rules that respond to cyclical ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-042

Working Paper
Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements and Implementable Capital Buffer Rules

We build a quantitatively relevant macroeconomic model with endogenous risk-taking. In our model, deposit insurance and limited liability can lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. This excessive risk-taking can be triggered by aggregate or sectoral shocks that reduce the return on safer loans. Excessive risk-taking can be avoided by raising bank capital requirements, but unnecessarily tight requirements lower welfare by limiting liquidity producing bank deposits. Consequently, optimal capital requirements are dynamic (or state contingent). We provide examples in which ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-056

Working Paper
A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance

In this paper, we discuss a new interpretation of what might be meant by the "coordination" of policies; in this interpretation, the policymakers are selecting a noncooperative solution rather than a cooperative solution. The new interpretation is suggested by the fact that games typically have a large number of Nash solutions, and players are not indifferent as to which occurs. The multiplicity of solutions may be due to information sharing and surveillance, the choice of policy instruments, or the adoption of reputational strategies in repeated versions of the game. The "coordination" ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 340

Conference Paper
A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance

Proceedings

Conference Paper
Price- and wage- inflation targeting: variations on a theme by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin

Proceedings

Working Paper
The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 248

Working Paper
Exchange intervention policy in a multiple country world

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 174

Working Paper
Wealth effects in the new neoclassical models

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 158

Conference Paper
Noncooperative monetary policies in interdependent economies: time consistency and reputation

Proceedings

Working Paper
Monetary policy games and the role of private information

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 249

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