Search Results
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Collateral and competition
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    The authors examine the effects of changes in competitive conditions on the structure of loan contracts. In particular, they present conditions in which greater loan market competition reduces the stringency of contractual collateral requirements, a prediction that is consistent with anecdotal evidence from loan markets. The authors also analyze the interaction between the degree of competition and the efficiency of contractual renegotiation. Insufficiently competitive markets may lead to bargaining difficulties that reduce the efficiency of renegotiable contracts. At low levels of ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Public versus private debt: confidentiality, control, and product markets
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    The authors examine a firm's choice between public and private debt in a model where the firm's financing source affects its product market behavior. Two effects are examined. When frims' risk-taking decisions are strategic substitutes, debt financing leads to excessively risky product market strategies (as in Brander and Lewis' (1986) Cournot oligopoly with debt). Lender control through restrictive covenants--which is characteristic of private debt--can commit the firm to reduce aggressiveness in product markets and increase expected profits. This is the monitoring effect. On the other hand, ...