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                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Gambling for Dollars: Strategic Hedge Fund Manager Investment
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    Hedge fund managers differ in ability and investors want to distinguish good ones from bad. Via the design of their investment strategies, better fund managers want to ease this inference problem while worse fund managers want to complicate it. We impose only the minimal restrictions on the nature the investment strategies that, on average, returns reflect the hedge fund manager?s ability and that returns be bounded from below, and solve for the set of equilibria that emerge. We then show that under a variety of equilibrium refinements, a unique equilibrium obtains. In this equilibrium, ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Nearsighted justice
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    Chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court. This paper identifies conditions under which it is optimal for the court to sometimes err in determining whether a firm should be liquidated. Such errors can affect the optimal action choices by both good and bad entrepreneurs. We first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation, providing conditions under which it is optimal for the court both to sometimes mistakenly liquidate "good firms," but not "bad firms." When creditors and debtors can renegotiate to ...