Search Results
Working Paper
Debt covenants and renegotiation
Journal Article
That thing venture capitalist do
Although many people know the term venture capital, not many people know precisely what role venture capitalists play in the economy. How do they identify entrepreneurs with promising new ideas? What kinds of services do they provide to these entrepreneurs? Mitchell Berlin answers these and other questions as he describes "that thing venture capitalists do."
Working Paper
The choice between bonds and bank loans
Working Paper
Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates
We ?nd that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without ?nancial covenants?so-called covenant-lite loans?borrowing ?rms? revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional ?nancial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the ?nancial covenants, and we con?rm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of ?nancial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate ...
Journal Article
New perspectives on consumer behavior in credit and payments markets
Mitchell Berlin summarizes new research on household finance presented at a joint conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Research Department and Payment Cards Center.
Journal Article
\\"We control the vertical\\": three theories of the firm
The author discusses three broad approaches to vertical integration. He then uses each approach, in turn, to examine the pros and cons of a firm's decision to integrate forward.
Working Paper
Intermediation and vertical integration
This paper views financial intermediaries as vertically integrated firms. The authors explore how competitive conditions in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for (upstream) originators and (downstream) fund managers to integrate. The underlying tradeoff in our model is driven by the choice between the production of an illiquid but high yielding loan and a liquid but relatively low yielding bond. The authors find that greater homogeneity among savers has two effects, both of which tend to increase the incentive to form integrated intermediaries. Greater homogeneity both ...
Working Paper
Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors
The authors explore the economic rationale for equitable subordination, a legal doctrine that permits a firm's claimants to seek to subordinate an informed investor's financial claim in bankruptcy court. Fear of equitable subordination is often cited as a reason that banks in the U.S. are wary of taking an active management role in their borrowing firms. The authors show that an optimally designed menu of claims for a large investor will include features that resemble equitable subordination. The authors' model provides a partial rationale for a financial system in which powerful creditors do ...
Journal Article
Debt maturity: What do economists say? What do CFOs say?
Mitchell Berlin discusses recent theories of how firms choose their debt maturity. Some of these theories are very useful for explaining how chief financial officers (CFOs) choose the maturity of their firms? debt. However, CFOs seem to believe that they can predict future interest rates and time their borrowings accordingly, and this behavior fundamentally conflicts with most economic theories.
Journal Article
Can we explain banks' capital structures?
Bank capital has been much in the news during the recent financial crisis. In 2008 and 2009 the U.S. government injected $235 billion of capital into the banking system as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 2009, bank regulators carried out a full-scale evaluation of the capital adequacy of 19 large banking organizations, ultimately requiring 10 of these organizations to increase their capital levels. While most commentators agree that regulatory capital levels are too low for large organizations ? especially large organizations that create systemic risks ? financial ...