Journal Article
How should banks account for loan losses?
Benston, George J.; Wall, Larry D. (2005-10)
The agencies that regulate banks are involved in an ongoing debate about the appropriate way for banks and other lenders to account for default risk on loans. Accounting authorities are concerned with whether the accounting method meets the needs of general-purpose users of financial statements, particularly investors. In contrast, bank supervisors are concerned about banks being inadequately capitalized and possibly failing. ; To shed light on this debate, this article reviews the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) currently used, which are based on historic-cost values for ...
Economic Review , Volume 90 , Issue Q4 , Pages 19-38

Report
Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1988)
Staff Memoranda , Paper 88-1

Discussion Paper
Economies of scale and scope in banking
Benston, George J.; Hanweck, Gerald A.; Berger, Allen N.; Humphrey, David B. (1983)
Research Papers in Banking and Financial Economics , Paper 64

Working Paper
Potential diversification and bank acquisition prices
Benston, George J.; Hunter, William C.; Wall, Larry D. (1990)
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 90-11

Journal Article
Commentary on \\"On the importance of the plumber: the intersection of theory and practice in policymaking for federal financial institutions\\"
Benston, George J. (2006-07)
Review , Volume 88 , Issue Jul , Pages 273-280

Report
Risks and failures in banking: overview, history, and evaluation
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1986)
Staff Memoranda , Paper 86-1

Conference Paper
Market discipline: the role of uninsured depositors and other market participants
Benston, George J. (1993)
Conference Series ; [Proceedings] , Volume 37 , Pages 65-95

Working Paper
FDICIA after five years: a review and evaluation
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1997)
At yearend 1991, Congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts in the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA). This reform followed the failure of more than 2,000 depository institutions in the 1980s. Many of these failed because of the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government-provided deposit insurance, which encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators. Insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis by providing for a graduated series of sanctions that mimic market discipline and first may and then must ...
Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation , Paper WP-97-01

Working Paper
Is the banking and payments system fragile?
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1994)
Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation , Paper 94-28

Journal Article
Roundtable discussion: reflection on twenty years of bank regulatory reform
Benston, George J.; Eisenbeis, Robert A.; Kaufman, George G.; Horvitz, Paul M.; Kane, Edward J. (2007-01-02)
In 1986 the American Bankers Association asked five banking academics to assess and recommend policy options to improve the banking system's efficiency, performance, and safety. The report these five economists produced, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and Future, has in many ways served as a roadmap for ensuing bank regulatory reforms. In this roundtable discussion, each of the five authors reflects on the past twenty years and the current status of the banking industry and, in some cases, shares thoughts about the industry's future direction.
Economic Review , Issue Q1-2 , Pages 119-138