Working Paper
Motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions: enhancing the deposit insurance put option versus increasing operating net cash flow
Benston, George J.; Hunter, William C.; Wall, Larry D. (1992)
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 92-4

Conference Paper
Market-value accounting: benefits, costs and incentives
Benston, George J. (1989)
Proceedings , Paper 255

Journal Article
Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1998-04)
In 1991, the U.S. adopted fundamental deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act. This article reveals why such reform was necessary in light of the severe banking crisis of the 1980s and analyzes its success to date.
Economic Perspectives , Volume 22 , Issue Q II , Pages 2-20

Conference Paper
What should bank regulators do? Why should regulators do anything?
Benston, George J. (1996)
Proceedings , Paper 490

Journal Article
How should banks account for loan losses?
Benston, George J.; Wall, Larry D. (2005-10)
The agencies that regulate banks are involved in an ongoing debate about the appropriate way for banks and other lenders to account for default risk on loans. Accounting authorities are concerned with whether the accounting method meets the needs of general-purpose users of financial statements, particularly investors. In contrast, bank supervisors are concerned about banks being inadequately capitalized and possibly failing. ; To shed light on this debate, this article reviews the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) currently used, which are based on historic-cost values for ...
Economic Review , Volume 90 , Issue Q4 , Pages 19-38

Report
Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1988)
Staff Memoranda , Paper 88-1

Working Paper
FDICIA after five years: a review and evaluation
Benston, George J.; Kaufman, George G. (1997)
At yearend 1991, Congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts in the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA). This reform followed the failure of more than 2,000 depository institutions in the 1980s. Many of these failed because of the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government-provided deposit insurance, which encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators. Insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis by providing for a graduated series of sanctions that mimic market discipline and first may and then must ...
Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation , Paper WP-97-01

Journal Article
Commentary on \\"On the importance of the plumber: the intersection of theory and practice in policymaking for federal financial institutions\\"
Benston, George J. (2006-07)
Review , Volume 88 , Issue Jul , Pages 273-280

Conference Paper
FSLIC forbearance and the thrift debacle
Carhill, Mike; Benston, George J. (1992)
Proceedings , Paper 351

Working Paper
Potential diversification and bank acquisition prices
Benston, George J.; Hunter, William C.; Wall, Larry D. (1990)
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 90-11