Home About Latest Browse RSS Advanced Search

Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Staff Reports
Rational inattention in hiring decisions
Sushant Acharya
Shu Lin Wee
Abstract

We provide an information-based theory of matching efficiency fluctuations. Rationally inattentive firms have limited capacity to process information and cannot perfectly identify suitable applicants. During recessions, higher losses from hiring unsuitable workers cause firms to be more selective in hiring. When firms cannot obtain sufficient information about applicants, they err on the side of caution and accept fewer applicants to minimize losses from hiring unsuitable workers. Pro-cyclical acceptance rates drive a wedge between meeting and hiring rates, explaining fluctuations in matching efficiency. Quantitatively, our model replicates the joint behavior of unemployment rates and matching efficiency observed since the Great Recession.


Download Full text
Cite this item
Sushant Acharya & Shu Lin Wee, Rational inattention in hiring decisions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reports 878, 01 Feb 2019.
More from this series
JEL Classification:
Subject headings:
Keywords: rational inattention; hiring behavior; matching efficiency; composition of unemployed
For corrections, contact Amy Farber ()
Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Privacy Legal