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Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks
The FDIC used cross-guarantees to close thirty-eight subsidiaries of First Republic Bank Corporation in 1988 and eighteen subsidiaries of First City Bancorporation in 1992 when lead banks from each of these Texas-based bank holding companies were declared insolvent. I use this exogenous failure of otherwise healthy subsidiary banks as a natural experiment for studying the impact of bank failure on local-area real economic activity. I find that the closings of the subsidiaries were associated with a significant decline in bank lending that led to a permanent reduction in real county income of about 3 percent.
Cite this item
Adam B. Ashcraft, Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reports 176, 01 Dec 2003.
Note: For a published version of this report, see Adam B. Ashcraft, "Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks," American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (December 2005): 1712-30.
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Keywords: bank failures; cross-guarantee; uniqueness of banks
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fednsr:176
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