Working Paper

Debt collection agencies and the supply of consumer credit

Abstract: Superseded by Working Paper 15-23 I examine contract enforcement in consumer credit markets by studying the role of third-party debt collectors. In order to identify the effect of debt collectors on credit supply, I construct a state-level index of the tightness of debt collection laws. I find that stricter regulations of third-party debt collectors are associated with a lower number of third-party debt collectors per capita and with fewer openings of revolving lines of credit. One additional restriction on debt collection activity reduces the number of debt collectors per capita by 15.9% of the sample mean and lowers the number of new revolving lines of credit by 2.2% of the sample mean. At the same time, regulations of third-party debt collectors do not affect secured consumer credit, which is consistent with the fact that debt collectors are used to enforce unsecured debt contracts. Stricter regulations of debt collectors decrease credit card recovery rates (by 9% of the sample mean for each additional restriction on debt collection activity), which appears to be the transmission mechanism by which debt collectors affect credit supply. The effect of debt collection laws is significant even when average credit scores are controlled for, meaning that consumer credit risk is not the only driver of credit access. My results can help explain the existence of a large market for unsecured consumer credit and shed light on contract enforcement in this market.

Keywords: Household finance; Consumer credit; Lender protection; Creditor rights; Contract enforcement; Debt collection; Law and finance;

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Part of Series: Working Papers

Publication Date: 2014-08-25

Number: 13-38

Pages: 66 pages