Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance

RePEc Short ID: pme136
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0393-7918

Hughes, Joseph P.; Lang, William W.; Mester, Loretta J.; Moon, Choon-Geol; Pagano, Michael S.

Working Paper

Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance

Abstract: Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders? value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at U.S. bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are associated with improved performance. At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance. Consistent with scale economies, an increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks.

Keywords: Bank holding companies; Bank mergers;