Report
Information and Market Power in DeFi Intermediation
Abstract: We investigate how private information shapes profit sharing in the DeFi intermediation chain, the market structure emerging from proof-of-stake blockchain technology on Ethereum. Leveraging a unique dataset that distinguishes private and public transactions, we find that a one percent increase in the value of private information leads to a 0.57 percent increase in block builders’ profit share, underscoring the role of information asymmetry in intermediated financial markets. We further develop a dynamic bargaining model that illustrates how private information confers market power to intermediaries. These results extend financial intermediation theory by revealing how blockchain transparency interacts with privacy to sustain arbitrage rents, offering timely insights as DeFi integrates with traditional finance.
JEL Classification: D43; D82; G14; G23; L14; L22;
https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1102
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Part of Series: Staff Reports
Publication Date: 2024-05-01
Number: 1102
Note: Revised March 2025.