Settlement risk under gross and net settlement
Abstract: Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements, and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement systems avoid certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Part of Series: Staff Reports
Publication Date: 1999