Optimal disinflation under learning
Abstract: Highly volatile transition dynamics can emerge when a central bank disinflates while operating without full transparency. In our model, a central bank commits to a Taylor rule whose form is known but whose coefficients are not. Private agents learn about policy parameters via Bayesian updating. Under McCallum?s (1999) timing protocol, temporarily explosive dynamics can arise, making the transition highly volatile. Locally unstable dynamics emerge when there is substantial disagreement between actual and perceived feedback parameters. The central bank can achieve low average inflation, but its ability to adjust reaction coefficients is more limited.
File format is text/html
Description: Full text
File format is application/pdf
File(s): File format is application/pdf https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr524_appendix.pdf
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Part of Series: Staff Reports
Publication Date: 2014-05-01
Note: For a published version of this report, see Timothy Cogley, Christian Matthes, and Argia M. Sbordone, "Optimal Disinflation under Learning," Review of Economic Studies 82, no. 2 (April 2015): 791-824.