Designing incentive-compatible regulation in banking: the role of penalty in the precommitment approach
Abstract: This paper was presented at the conference \\"Financial services at the crossroads: capital regulation in the twenty-first century\\" as part of session 4, \\"Incentive-compatible regulations: views on the precommitment approach.\\" The conference, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on February 26-27, 1998, was designed to encourage a consensus between the public and private sectors on an agenda for capital regulation in the new century.
Status: Published in Financial services at the crossroads: capital regulation in the twenty-first century
File(s): File format is application/pdf https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/98v04n3/9810koba.pdf
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Part of Series: Economic Policy Review
Publication Date: 1998