Public Good Provision, Tax Evasion, and Illicit Production

RePEc Short ID: pth73
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5071-7849

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Marjit, Sugata; Pinto, Santiago; Thum, Marcel

doi:10.20955/wp.2025.005

Working Paper Revision

Public Good Provision, Tax Evasion, and Illicit Production

Abstract: We investigate the trade-off policymakers face between raising tax revenues for public good provision and mitigating the distortionary effects of taxation when individuals can evade taxes and allocate work time between legal and illicit activities. These distortions lower the constrained optimal tax rate and lead to the under-provision of the public good. This under-provision problem is mitigated when surplus generated by the audit agency is seamlessly transferred to the taxing authorities. Extensions of the basic model allow the government to endogenously choose the audit intensity as part of the tax enforcement policy, introduce agent heterogeneity, and consider a more general concealment cost function.

JEL Classification: H2; H4; K10;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2025.005