Immigration from a terror-prone nation: destination nation’s optimal immigration and counterterrorism policies

RePEc Short ID: pga715
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9014-9532

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Gaibulloev, Khusrav; Sandler, Todd

doi:10.20955/wp.2023.014

Working Paper

Immigration from a terror-prone nation: destination nation’s optimal immigration and counterterrorism policies

Abstract: The paper presents a two-country model in which a destination country chooses its immigration quota and proactive counterterrorism actions in response to immigration from a terror-plagued source country. After the destination country fixes its two policies, immigrants decide between supplying labor or conducting terrorist attacks, which helps determine equilibrium labor supply and wages. The analysis accounts for the marginal disutility of lost rights/freedoms stemming from stricter counterterror measures as well the inherent radicalization of migrants. Comparative statics involve changes to those two parameters. For example, an enhanced importance attached to lost rights is shown to limit immigration quotas and counterterrorism actions. In contrast, increased source-country radicalization reduces immigration quotas but has an ambiguous effect on optimal proactive measures. Extensions involving defensive policies and destination-country citizens radicalization are considered.

Keywords: immigration; terrorism; counterterrorism; rights; freedoms; radicalization; labor market equilibrium;

JEL Classification: H56; F22; H87;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2023.014