Working Paper Revision
On Terms of Trade, Offshoring Ties, and the Enforcement of Trade Agreements
Abstract: This paper unpacks the role of offshoring in the enforcement of trade agreements. In a two-country model of task offshoring, we show that by depressing demand and thus demand for embodied labor, own-tariff effects on factor content weighted terms of trade are: (i) negative in upstream countries, backfiring on upstream workers, and (ii) positive in downstream countries which render imported labor tasks even cheaper. This progression in own-tariff effects on terms of trade along the supply chain presents a novel challenge to the effectiveness of dispute settlement rules designed to nullify unwarranted terms of trade gains. The pros and cons of deep trade integration as a remedy, involving well-enforced labor standards both upstream and downstream as an integral part of trade agreements, are highlighted.
Keywords: offshoring; dispute settlement reciprocity; labor standards;
JEL Classification: F11; F13; F16; F66; O19; O24;
https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2022.039
Access Documents
File(s):
File format is application/pdf
https://s3.amazonaws.com/real.stlouisfed.org/wp/2022/2022-039.pdf
Description: Full text
Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 2023-04
Number: 2022-039
Related Works
- Working Paper Revision (2023-04) : You are here.
- Working Paper Original (2022-12) : On Trade Policy Preference and Offshoring Ties