Working Paper Revision

On Terms of Trade, Offshoring Ties, and the Enforcement of Trade Agreements


Abstract: This paper unpacks the role of offshoring in the enforcement of trade agreements. In a two-country model of task offshoring, we show that by depressing demand and thus demand for embodied labor, own-tariff effects on factor content weighted terms of trade are: (i) negative in upstream countries, backfiring on upstream workers, and (ii) positive in downstream countries which render imported labor tasks even cheaper. This progression in own-tariff effects on terms of trade along the supply chain presents a novel challenge to the effectiveness of dispute settlement rules designed to nullify unwarranted terms of trade gains. The pros and cons of deep trade integration as a remedy, involving well-enforced labor standards both upstream and downstream as an integral part of trade agreements, are highlighted.

Keywords: offshoring; dispute settlement reciprocity; labor standards;

JEL Classification: F11; F13; F16; F66; O19; O24;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2022.039

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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Part of Series: Working Papers

Publication Date: 2023-04

Number: 2022-039

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