Working Paper
Risky College Admissions and the (Mis)Allocation of Talent
Abstract: Why do high-achieving, low-income students not attend selective colleges? Leveraging restricted-use data, we show the gap arises at the application stage: lower-income students apply much less, while admission and enrollment differences are modest. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model in which heterogeneous students and colleges each hold noisy assessments of ability, borrowing-constrained students choose application portfolios under admission and financial-aid risk, and colleges with scarce seats compete through admission standards and tuition schedules. Because only the highest-ability low-income students apply, colleges offer them generous aid. Expanding aid raises tuition and standards, not enrollment. Better information, not subsidies, puts talent where it belongs.
JEL Classification: E24; D82; I22; I23; I24;
https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2026.026
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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/frbsl_wp/2026-026.pdf
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 2026-11-16
Number: 2026-026