Endogenous export subsidies and welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Park, Eun-Soo; Wall, Howard J.

Working Paper

Endogenous export subsidies and welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity

Abstract: We present a model of Cournot rivalry where domestic and foreign firms compete in a third-country market, and where the domestic export subsidy is determined by lobbying. Greater domestic cost heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the marginal costs of the domestic firms) means that the subsidy level, aggregate domestic output, and domestic market share will all be higher. However, the effect of heterogeneity on domestic welfare is ambiguous. From a near-symmetric initial situation, greater domestic cost-heterogeneity reduces domestic welfare if the number of domestic firms exceeds some critical value. However, when starting further from symmetry, greater heterogeneity may raise welfare. Our results are in contrast with the no-lobbying scenario, where market share is independent of increased heterogeneity, and welfare is monotonically increasing in it.

Keywords: Export controls;

Status: Published in Economics and Politics, 2004, 16:3, pp. 347-366