Working Paper
Lender exposure and effort in the syndicated loan market
Abstract: This paper tests for agency problems between the lead arranger and syndicate participants in the syndicated loan market. One problem comes from adverse selection, whereby the lead arranger has a private informational advantage over participants. A second problem comes from moral hazard, whereby the lead arranger puts less effort in monitoring when it retains a smaller loan portion. Applying an instrumental variables strategy, I find that borrowers' performance is influenced by the lead's share. Dynamic tests extract active contributions made by the lead, supporting a monitoring interpretation. Loan covenants serve as a mechanism to induce the lead arranger to monitor.
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File(s): File format is application/pdf https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/5307/pdf-rwp10-12.pdf
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Part of Series: Research Working Paper
Publication Date: 2010
Number: RWP 10-12