Cyclical dumping and U.S. antidumping protection: 1980-2001
Abstract: In this paper, I test the theory that weak economic conditions in a foreign economy cause cyclical dumping, i.e., the temporary sale of products in a trading partner's economy at a price below average total cost. Although I am unable to observe prices or costs directly, a novel identification strategy allows me to uncover evidence of cyclical dumping. Using country- specific information on foreign economic shocks in manufacturing industries, filing decisions by the US industry, and antidumping decisions by the US government, I am able to identify strong evidence of cyclical dumping. After controlling for other factors that likely drive industry filing and government decisions, I find that a one standard deviation fall in the growth of employment in a foreign economy's manufacturing industry quadruples the joint probability that the US industry will file an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a preliminary (temporary) antidumping measure. Further, a one standard deviation fall in foreign employment growth more than doubles the joint probability that a petition will be filed and a final (long-lasting) antidumping measure will be imposed.
Keywords: Antidumping duties;
File(s): File format is application/pdf http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2007/wp2007_21.pdf
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Part of Series: Working Paper Series
Publication Date: 2007