Working Paper

Contracting with Feedback


Abstract: We study the effect of financial market conditions on managerial compensation structure. First, we analyze the optimal pay-for-performance in a model in which corporate decisions and firm value are both endogenous to trading due to feedback from information contained in stock prices. In a less frictional financial market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions, and this information substitutes out part of the direct incentive provision from compensation contracts. Thus, the optimal pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reductions in market frictions. Second, we test our theory using two quasi-natural experiments and find evidence that is consistent with the theory. Our results indicate that the financial market environment plays an important role in shaping CEO compensation structure.

Keywords: Feedback effect; CEO compensation; Transaction costs; Reg-SHO Pilot program; Decimalization;

JEL Classification: G30; J33;

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File(s): File format is application/pdf http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2015/files/ifdp1143.pdf
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File(s): File format is application/pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2015.1143
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Bibliographic Information

Provider: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Part of Series: International Finance Discussion Papers

Publication Date: 2015-08-13

Number: 1143

Pages: 60 pages