Working Paper
Mortgage Design, Repayment Schedules, and Household Borrowing
Abstract: How does the design of debt repayment schedules affect household borrowing? To answer this question, we exploit a Swedish policy reform that eliminated interest-only mortgages for loan-to-value ratios above 50%. We document substantial bunching at the threshold, leading to 5% less borrowing. Wealthy borrowers drive the results, challenging credit constraints as the primary explanation. We develop a model to evaluate the mechanisms driving household behavior and find that much of the effect comes from households experiencing ongoing flow disutility to amortization payments. Our results indicate that new mortgage contracts with low initial payments substantially increase household borrowing and lifetime interest costs.
Keywords: Mortgage design; Amortization payments; Macroprudential policy; Bunching;
JEL Classification: G51; G21; E21; E60;
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.077
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File(s): File format is application/pdf https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2024077pap.pdf
Bibliographic Information
Provider: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Part of Series: Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Publication Date: 2024-09-20
Number: 2024-077