Debt Flexibility

Bidder, Rhys M.; Crouzet, Nicolas; Jacobson, Margaret M.; Siemer, Michael

doi:10.17016/FEDS.2023.076r1

Working Paper Revision

Debt Flexibility

Abstract: How flexible are corporate loans after origination? Theory predicts coordination problems should make syndicated loans harder to modify than single-bank loans. We show the opposite. Using comprehensive regulatory data, we document that syndicated loans are modified frequently and respond to borrower distress, while single-lender loans are half as likely to be modified. This gap is not explained by covenants or performance pricing. Instead, syndicated loans are monitored more intensively. We show theoretically and empirically how fixed monitoring costs generate scale economies: larger loans justify continuous monitoring enabling flexible renegotiation, while smaller borrowers receive arm’s-length contracts with limited scope for modifications.

JEL Classification: G21; G32; G33;

https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2023.076r1