Working Paper

Inflation and Deflationary Biases in Inflation Expectations


Abstract: We explore the consequences of losing confidence in the price-stability objective of central banks by quantifying the inflation and deflationary biases in inflation expectations. In a model with an occasionally binding zero-lower-bound constraint, we show that an inflation bias as well as a deflationary bias exist as a steady-state outcome. We assess the predictions of this model using unique individual-level inflation expectations data across nine countries that allow for a direct identification of these biases. Both inflation and deflationary biases are present (and sizable) in inflation expectations of these individuals. Among the euro-area countries in our sample, we can document significant differences in perceptions of the European Central Bank??s objectives, despite having a common monetary policy.

Keywords: ZLB; Confidence in Central Banks; Deflationary Bias; Inflation Bias; Inflation Expectations; Microdata;

JEL Classification: E58; E31; D84; E37;

https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2019.042

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Bibliographic Information

Provider: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Part of Series: Finance and Economics Discussion Series

Publication Date: 2019-06-03

Number: 2019-042

Pages: 52 pages