Working Paper
A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games
Abstract: This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equilibria.
Keywords: Game theory; Econometric models; Equilibrium (Economics);
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Part of Series: Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Publication Date: 2005
Number: 2005-37