Bank Risk-Taking and Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence from China
Abstract: We present evidence that monetary policy easing reduces bank risk-taking but exacerbates capital misallocation in China after implementing the Basel III capital regulationsin2013. Thenewregulationstightenedbankcapitalrequirementsandintroduced a new risk-weighting approach to calculating the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). To meet tightened capital requirements, a bank can boost its eﬀective CAR by raising capital or by increasing the share of lending to low-risk borrowers. Using conﬁdential loan-level data from a large Chinese commercial bank, merged with ﬁrm-level data on a large set of manufacturing ﬁrms, we document robust evidence that a monetary policy expansion raises the share of new bank loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) after 2013, but not before, because SOE loans receive high credit ratings under government guarantees. Since SOEs are on average less productive than private ﬁrms, shifts in bank lending toward SOEs exacerbate capital misallocations, reducing aggregate productivity. We construct a two-sector general equilibrium model with bank portfolio choices and show that, under calibrated parameters, an expansionary monetary policy shock raises the share of bank lending to SOEs, leading to persistent declines in total factor productivity that partially oﬀset the expansionary eﬀects of monetary policy.
File(s): File format is application/pdf https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2020-27.pdf
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Part of Series: Working Paper Series
Publication Date: 2020-08-03