Working Paper
Appointing the median voter of a policy board
Abstract: A description of a model which demonstrates that delegating monetary policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers substantially reduces policy uncertainty while maintaining political accountability.
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-199802
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 1998
Number: 9802