Working Paper
The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation
Abstract: A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks? growth opportunities, making their CEOs? total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.
Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; Executives - Salaries;
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-199805
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 1998
Number: 9805