Working Paper
Anticipating bailouts: the incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund
Abstract: An examination of the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions in the context of the incentive-conflict model developed by Edward Kane, finding that differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms tend to reaffirm that taxpayer-funded bailouts are a natural outgrowth of the moral-hazard problem that taxpayers face.
Keywords: Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund; Bank stocks;
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 1994
Number: 9407