Working Paper
Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules
Abstract: An analysis showing that allowing creditors to \"run\" on a firm in financial distress is socially valuable, since it compensates them for monitoring the firm's condition; in contrast, strict adherence to absolute and proportionate priority rules allows lenders to free ride on the monitoring efforts of others, exacerbating the firm's moral hazard problem.
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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/working-paper-federal-reserve-bank-cleveland-4494/bankruptcy-rules-debt-contracting-494615
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 1994
Number: 9415