Working Paper
Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules
Abstract: An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.
Keywords: Monetary policy;
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-199601
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 1996
Number: 9601