Journal Article
Theories of interjurisdictional competition
Abstract: What behavior can be expected from state and local governments, given market-analogy theories of intergovernmental competition (competition enhances efficiency) and game-theoretic models (competition is destructive)? How does the real world depart from these paradigms? What empirical hypotheses do they imply concerning the effectiveness of alternative competitive public policies? Paper: Daphne A. Kenyon Discussion: Caroline M. Hoxby, Andrew Reschovsky
Keywords: state finances;
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Part of Series: New England Economic Review
Publication Date: 1997
Issue: Mar
Pages: 13-36