Working Paper
Job search with bidder memories
Abstract: This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/working-papers-federal-reserve-bank-atlanta-8586/job-search-bidder-memories-656999
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Part of Series: FRB Atlanta Working Paper
Publication Date: 2009
Number: 2009-28