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Working Paper
Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance
The spread of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in finance could help to improve the efficiency and quality of supervision. This paper makes the case for embedded supervision, i.e., a regulatory framework that provides for compliance in tokenized markets to be automatically monitored by reading the market?s ledger, thus reducing the need for firms to actively collect, verify and deliver data. After sketching out a design for such schemes, the paper explores the conditions under which distributed ledger data might be used to monitor compliance. To this end, a decentralized market is modelled ...
Conference Paper
How do analysts weight private information and why?
Working Paper
Data Privacy for Digital Asset Systems
Data privacy in digital asset systems is of sustained importance to end users. However, there can be disconnect between an end users' expectations of privacy while using a digital asset payment system and the system's actual treatment of collected, stored, and used data. This paper provides foundational primer on data privacy alongside qualitative and technical assessments of various approaches to data privacy frameworks and strategies relevant to the early stages of a digital asset system's design. Analysis relies initially on an outlay of foundational data privacy concepts, including ...
Journal Article
Privacy matters: Payments Cards Center Workshop on the right to privacy and the financial services industry.
"Privacy Matters: Payments Cards Center Workshop on the Right to Privacy and the Financial Services Industry," summarizes the main points of a workshop sponsored by the Bank's Payment Cards Center. The workshop, led by University of Pennsylvania law professor Anita L. Allen, covered the privacy provisions of GLB. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 01-07
Report
Monetizing Privacy
In a market where consumers choose between payment options and firms compete with products and prices, we show that payment data drives the formation of a market monopoly. A data-sharing policy can successfully restore and maintain a competitive market, but often at the expense of both efficiency and consumer welfare. The introduction of a low-cost anonymous means of electronic payment, or digital cash, preserves the market structure and improves consumers’ welfare by enabling them to monetize their private information. We discuss the potential role of central banks in providing digital ...
Discussion Paper
Monetizing Privacy with Central Bank Digital Currencies
In prior research, we documented evidence suggesting that digital payment adoptions have accelerated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. While digitalization of payment activity improves data utilization by firms, it can also infringe upon consumers’ right to privacy. Drawing from a recent paper, this blog post explains how payment data acquired by firms impacts market structure and consumer welfare. Then, we discuss the implications of introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) that offers consumers a low-cost, privacy-preserving electronic means of payment—essentially, digital ...
Working Paper
A theory of transactions privacy
In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation will result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made ...
Discussion Paper
Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination
The consumer suffers because she buys less (with the loss represented by the red area). And while not depicted, she also suffers from future price discrimination due to information about her willingness to pay (that is, the intercept of her demand function) getting transmitted to Firm 2. However, Firm 1 is forced to lower its price (P’ in the figure) after the strategic demand reduction occurs. If the consumer has high willingness to pay, the benefit of this discount applied to many units is such that she wants to be tracked (the blue area—a benefit—grows as the intercept of demand ...