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Keywords:delegation OR Delegation 

Working Paper
Financial Stability Committees and Basel III Macroprudential Capital Buffers

We evaluate how a country’s governance structure for macroprudential policy affects its implementation of Basel III macroprudential capital buffers. We find that the probabilities of using the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) are higher in countries that have financial stability committees (FSCs) with stronger governance mechanisms and fewer agencies, which reduces coordination problems. These higher probabilities are more sensitive to credit growth, consistent with the CCyB being used to mitigate systemic risk. A country’s probability of using the CCyB is even higher when the FSC ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-016

Working Paper
On Targeting Frameworks and Optimal Monetary Policy

Speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently delivers better welfare outcomes than flexible inflation targeting or flexible price level targeting in empirical New Keynesian models when policymakers lack the ability to commit to future policies. Even if the policymaker can commit under an inflation targeting strategy, the discretionary speed limit policy performs better for most empirically plausible model parameterizations from a normative perspective.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-098

Working Paper
MODEL SECRECY AND STRESS TESTS

Conventional wisdom holds that the models used to stress test banks should be kept secret to prevent gaming. We show instead that secrecy can be suboptimal, because although it deters gaming, it may also deter socially desirable investment. When the regulator can choose the minimum standard for passing the test, we show that secrecy is suboptimal if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain regarding bank characteristics. When failing the bank is socially costly, then under some conditions, secrecy is suboptimal when the bank's private cost of failure is either sufficiently high or sufficiently ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-41

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Bodenstein, Martin 1 items

Edge, Rochelle M. 1 items

Leitner, Yaron 1 items

Liang, J. Nellie 1 items

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Zhao, Junzhu 1 items

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