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Working Paper
Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities
We study the negative feedback loop between the aggregate default rate and the efficacy of enforcement in a model of debt-financed entrepreneurial activity. The novel feature of our model is that enforcement capacity is accumulated ex ante and thus subject to depletion ex post. We characterize the effect of shocks that deplete enforcement resources on the aggregate default rate and credit supply. In the model default decisions by entrepreneurs are strategic complements, leading to multiple equilibria. We propose a global game selection to overcome equilibrium indeterminacy and show how shocks ...
Report
The Interaction and Sequencing of Policy Reforms
In what order should a developing country adopt policy reforms? Do some policies complement each other? Do others substitute for each other? To address these questions, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms that are monopolistic competitors. Distortions in the model include barriers to entry of firms, barriers to international trade, and barriers to contract enforcement. We find that a reform that reduces one of these distortions has different effects depending on the other distortions present. In particular, reforms to trade barriers and ...
Working Paper
Debt Collection Agencies and the Supply of Consumer Credit
This paper finds that stricter laws regulating third-party debt collection reduce the number of third-party debt collectors, lower the recovery rates on delinquent credit card loans, and lead to a modest decrease in the openings of new revolving lines of credit. Further, stricter third-party debt collection laws are associated with fewer consumer lawsuits against third-party debt collectors but not with a reduction in the overall number of consumer complaints. Overall, stricter third-party debt collection laws appear to restrict access to new revolving credit but have an ambiguous effect on ...
Working Paper
Credit Enforcement Cycles
Empirical evidence suggests that widespread financial distress, by disrupting enforcement of credit contracts, can be self-propagatory and adversely affect the supply of credit. We propose a unifying theory that models the interplay between enforcement, borrower default decisions, and the provision of credit. The central tenets of our framework are the presence of capacity constrained enforcement and borrower heterogeneity. We show that, despite heterogeneity, borrowers tend to coordinate their default choices, leading to fragility and to credit rationing. Our model provides a rationale for ...
Working Paper
The economics of debt collection: enforcement of consumer credit contracts
In the U.S., third-party debt collection agencies employ more than 140,000 people and recover more than $50 billion each year, mostly from consumers. Informational, legal, and other factors suggest that original creditors should have an advantage in collecting debts owed to them. Then, why does the debt collection industry exist and why is it so large? Explanations based on economies of scale or specialization cannot address many of the observed stylized facts. The authors develop an application of common agency theory that better explains those facts. The model explains how reliance on an ...
Working Paper
The Economics of Debt Collection: Enforcement of Consumer Credit Contracts
Creditors often outsource the task of obtaining repayment from defaulting borrowers to third-party debt collectors. We argue that by hiring third-party debt collectors, creditors can avoid competing in terms of their debt collection practices. This explanation fits several empirical facts about third-party debt collection and is consistent with the evidence that third-party debt collectors use harsher debt collection practices than original creditors. Our model shows that the impact of third-party debt collectors on consumer welfare depends on the riskiness of the pool of borrowers and ...
Working Paper
Debt collection agencies and the supply of consumer credit
Superseded by Working Paper 15-23 I examine contract enforcement in consumer credit markets by studying the role of third-party debt collectors. In order to identify the effect of debt collectors on credit supply, I construct a state-level index of the tightness of debt collection laws. I find that stricter regulations of third-party debt collectors are associated with a lower number of third-party debt collectors per capita and with fewer openings of revolving lines of credit. One additional restriction on debt collection activity reduces the number of debt collectors per capita by 15.9% of ...
Working Paper
The economics of debt collection: enforcement of consumer credit contracts
Superceded by WP 18-04 In the U.S., creditors often outsource the task of obtaining repayment from defaulting borrowers to third-party debt collection agencies. This paper argues that an important incentive for this is creditors' concerns about their reputations. Using a model along the lines of the common agency framework, we show that, under certain conditions, debt collection agencies use harsher debt collection practices than original creditors would use on their own. This appears to be consistent with empirical evidence. The model also fits several other empirical facts about the ...
Working Paper
Debt collection agencies and the supply of consumer credit
Supersedes Working Paper 13-38/R. The activities of third-party debt collectors affect millions of borrowers. However, relatively little is known about their impact on consumer credit. To study this issue, I investigate whether state debt collection laws affect the ability of third-party debt collectors to recover delinquent debts and if this, in turn, affects the amount of credit being provided. This paper constructs, from state statutes and session laws, a state-level index of debt collection restrictions and uses changes in this index over time to estimate the impact of debt collection ...