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Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 11.
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Speech
Lessons from the financial crisis: remarks at The Economic Club of New York, New York City
Remarks at The Economic Club of New York, New York City.
Report
Did liquidity providers become liquidity seekers?
The misalignment between corporate bond and credit default swap (CDS) spreads (i.e., CDS-fbond basis) during the 2007-09 financial crisis is often attributed to corporate bond dealers shedding off their inventory, right when liquidity was scarce. This paper documents evidence against this widespread perception. In the months following Lehman?s collapse, dealers, including proprietary trading desks in investment banks, provided liquidity in response to the large selling by clients. Corporate bond inventory of dealers rose sharply as a result. Although providing liquidity, limits to arbitrage, ...
Working Paper
Dealer costs and customer choice
We introduce a model to explain how an increase in intermediation costs leads to structural changes in the corporate bond market. We state three facts on corporate bond markets after the Dodd-Frank act: (1) an increase in customer liquidity provision through prearranged matches, (2) a paradoxical decrease in measured illiquidity, and (3) an increase in the illiquidity component on the yield spread. Investors take longer to finish a trade and require higher illiquidity premium even though measured illiquidity decreased. We introduce a search and matching model which explains these facts. It ...
Speech
Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017
Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017.
Speech
Transcript of the Cornell College of Business Annual New York City Predictions Event: February 15, 2017
Transcript of the Cornell College of Business Annual New York City Predictions Event: February 15, 2017.
Working Paper
Customer Liquidity Provision : Implications for Corporate Bond Transaction Costs
The convention in calculating trading costs in corporate bond markets is to assume that dealers provide liquidity to non-dealers (customers) and calculate average bid-ask spreads that customers pay dealers. We show that customers often provide liquidity in corporate bond markets, and thus, average bid-ask spreads underestimate trading costs that customers demanding liquidity pay. Compared with periods before the 2008 financial crisis, substantial amounts of liquidity provision have moved from the dealer sector to the non-dealer sector, consistent with decreased dealer risk capacity. Among ...
Speech
Transcript of Fireside Chat at Rutgers University—New Brunswick: November 29, 2017
Transcript of Fireside Chat at Rutgers University?New Brunswick: November 29, 2017.
Speech
Principles for financial regulatory reform: remarks at the Princeton Club of New York, New York City
Remarks at the Princeton Club of New York, New York City.
Speech
Market and funding liquidity: an overview, remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, Fernandina Beach, Florida, May 2016
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, Fernandina Beach, Florida.
Working Paper
The Volcker Rule and Market-Making in Times of Stress
Focusing on downgrades as stress events that drive the selling of corporate bonds, we document that the illiquidity of stressed bonds has increased after the Volcker Rule. Dealers regulated by the Rule have decreased their market-making activities while non-Volcker-affected dealers have stepped in to provide some additional liquidity. Furthermore, even Volcker-affected dealers that are not constrained by Basel III and CCAR regulations change their behavior, inconsistent with the effects being driven by these other regulations. Since Volcker-affected dealers have been the main liquidity ...