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Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 11.
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Working Paper
Should risky firms offer risk-free DB pensions?
We develop a simple model of pension financing to study the effects of pension risk on shareholder value. In the model, firms minimize costs, total compensation must clear the labor market, and a government pension insurer guarantees a portion of promised benefits. We find that in the absence of mispriced pension insurance, the optimal pension strategy under most specifications is to immunize all sources of market risk. Mispriced pension insurance, however, gives firms the incentive to introduce risk into their pension promises, offering an explanation for some of the observed prevalence of ...
Report
Pay with Promises or Pay as You Go? Lessons from the Death Spiral of Detroit
As part of compensation, municipal employees typically receive promises of future benefits. Motivated by the recent bankruptcy of Detroit, we develop a model of the equilibrium size of a city and use it to analyze how pay-with-promises schemes interact with city growth. The paper examines the circumstances under which a death spiral arises, where cutbacks of city services and increases in taxes lead to an exodus of residents, compounding financial distress. The model is put to work to analyze issues such as the welfare effects of having cities absorb pension risk and how unions affect the ...
Journal Article
Is the pension system a liability?
Working Paper
Footnotes aren’t enough: the impact of pension accounting on stock values
Some research has suggested that companies with defined benefit (DB) pensions are sometimes significantly misvalued by the market. This is because the measures of pension cost and pension net liabilities embedded in financial statements, taken at face value, can provide a very misleading picture of pension finances. The more pertinent information on pension finances is relegated to footnotes, but this might not receive much attention from portfolio managers. But dramatic swings in the financial conditions of large DB plans around the turn of the decade focused widespread attention on pension ...
Working Paper
Explaining the evolution of pension structure and job tenure
Average and expected job tenure of workers has fallen significantly over the last two decades. Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage. Traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common, while defined contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread. The link between job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it offers insights about both phenomena. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain changes in both pension structure and job tenure; we ...
Journal Article
An actuarial balancing act
Debates over public pensions can quickly plunge into the pool of minutiae and tediousness.
Journal Article
In case of pension emergency
Legislatures nationwide will no doubt be debating what to do about public pensions with large unfunded liabilities. Discussion of two options getting considerable attention.
Journal Article
Pension deficit disorder
Local and state public pensions are trying to get traction on a slippery funding slope.
Working Paper
Are firms or workers behind the shift away from DB pension plan?
One of the most striking changes in the composition of household retirement savings over the past 20 years has been the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans. Understanding the factors underlying this shift is important for determining its impact on retirement saving adequacy. Yet previous research, which has mostly focused on factors affecting all firms, such as regulation or increased longevity, has yielded little consensus. In this study we estimate the contribution of changing workforce characteristics and production environments to the shift in pension ...
Report
Deferred compensation, risk, and company value: investor reactions to CEO incentives
Many commentators have suggested that companies pay top executives with deferred compensation, a type of incentive known as inside debt. Recent SEC disclosure reforms greatly increased the transparency of deferred compensation. We investigate stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of their CEOs' inside debt positions in early 2007, when new disclosure rules took effect. We find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops upon disclosures by firms whose CEOs have sizable defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation. ...