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Working Paper
Can Supply Shocks Be Inflationary with a Flat Phillips Curve?
Not in standard models. With conventional pricing frictions, imposing a flat Phillips curve also imposes a price level that is rigid with respect to supply shocks. In the New Keynesian model, price markup shocks need to be several orders of magnitude bigger than other shocks in order to fit the data, leading to unreasonable assessments of the magnitude of the increase in costs during inflationary episodes. To account for the facts, we propose a strategic microfoundation of shock-dependent price stickiness: prices are sticky with respect to demand shocks but flexible with respect to supply ...
Report
Cournot Fire Sales
In standard Walrasian macro-finance models, pecuniary externalities due to fire sales lead to excessive borrowing and insufficient liquidity holdings. We investigate whether imperfect competition (Cournot) improves welfare through internalizing the externality and find that this is far from guaranteed. Cournot competition can overcorrect the inefficiently high borrowing in a standard model of levered real investment. In contrast, Cournot competition can exacerbate the inefficiently low liquidity in a standard model of financial portfolio choice. Implications for welfare and regulation are ...
Discussion Paper
How Can Safe Asset Markets Be Fragile?
The market for U.S. Treasury securities experienced extreme stress in March 2020, when prices dropped precipitously (yields spiked) over a period of about two weeks. This was highly unusual, as Treasury prices typically increase during times of stress. Using a theoretical model, we show that markets for safe assets can be fragile due to strategic interactions among investors who hold Treasury securities for their liquidity characteristics. Worried about having to sell at potentially worse prices in the future, such investors may sell preemptively, leading to self-fulfilling “market runs” ...
Report
Fragility of Safe Asset Markets
In March 2020, safe asset markets experienced surprising and unprecedented price crashes. We explainhow strategic investor behavior can create such market fragility in a model with investors valuing safety,investors valuing liquidity, and constrained dealers. While safety investors and liquidity investors caninteract symbiotically with offsetting trades in times of stress, liquidity investors’ strategic interactionharbors the potential for self-fulfilling fragility. When the market is fragile, standard flight-to-safety canhave a destabilizing effect and trigger a “dash-for-cash” by ...
Discussion Paper
How Does Market Power Affect Fire-Sale Externalities?
An important role of capital and liquidity regulations for financial institutions is to counteract inefficiencies associated with “fire-sale externalities,” such as the tendency of institutions to lever up and hold illiquid assets to the extent that their collective actions increase financial vulnerabilities. However, theoretical models that study such externalities commonly assume perfect competition among financial institutions, in spite of high (and increasing) financial sector concentration. In this post, which is based on our forthcoming article, we consider instead how the effects ...