Search Results
Showing results 1 to 4 of approximately 4.
(refine search)
Working Paper
Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument
Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy--that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria--may often result. However, a policy rule with a long rate policy instrument that responds in a "forward-looking" fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.
Working Paper
Expectational stability in regime-switching rational expectations models
Regime-switching rational expectations models, in which the parameters of the model evolve according to a finite state Markov process, have properties that differentiate them from linear models. Issues that are well understood in linear contexts, such as equilibrium determinacy and stability under adaptive learning, re-emerge in this new context. This paper outlines these issues and defines two classes of equilibria that emerge from regime-switching models. The distinguishing feature between the two classes is whether the conditional density of the endogenous state variables depends on past ...
Working Paper
Adaptive learning, endogenous inattention, and changes in monetary policy
This paper develops an adaptive learning formulation of an extension to the Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) sticky information model that incorporates endogenous inattention. We show that, following an exogenous increase in the policymaker?s preferences for price vs. output stability, the learning process can converge to a new equilibrium in which both output and price volatility are lower.
Working Paper
Monetary policy, endogenous inattention, and the volatility trade-off
This paper addresses the output-price volatility puzzle by studying the interaction of optimal monetary policy and agents' beliefs. We assume that agents choose their information acquisition rate by minimizing a loss function that depends on expected forecast errors and information costs. Endogenous inattention is a Nash equilibrium in the information processing rate. Although a decline of policy activism directly increases output volatility, it indirectly anchors expectations, which decreases output volatility. If the indirect effect dominates then the usual trade-off between output and ...